




I. WHEN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS ARE PRIVILEGED.
[In THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER for November, 1887
(Vol. xxvi., N. S. 681-93), a review of the cases upon this sub-
ject established that special reports made by a commercial
agency to its subscribers, upon application, are privileged, even
though conveyed through the medium of clerks or agents;
and reports furnished to all subscribers through "notification
sheets" were of doubtful privilege. The following review of
the cases, in the light of all the decisions to date, finally estab-
lishes the legal principle that "notification sheets" are not
privileged, when made to all subscribers.]
In the 'earliest reported case, Goldstein v. Foss (1826),
2 C. & P., 252; S.C., 12 E. C. L. 556, the Secretary of "The
Society for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and
Sharpers," whose business it was to inquire into the character
and commercial standing of proposed members, reported to the
members of the society that the plaintiff, a tradesman, was an
improper person to be balloted for as a member. It was held
that the communication was defamatory and not privileged.
In Commonwealth v. Stacey (1871), 8 Phila. (Pa.) 617, an
agency had sent to all its subscribers a "notification sheet,"
containing the names of persons whose commercial ratings
should be changed from those given in a book previously fur-
nished. The sheet gave no particulars, but instructed sub-
scribers who were specially interested, to call'at the office of
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the agency, for information: The court held that tile commu-
nication was not privileged, and, in the course of its opinion,
said: "There is no great hardship imposed on an agency of
this kind, if they are required to know beforehand that their
statements are true, and that the persons to whom they are
sent have an interest in receiving the information."
But the generally accepted rule of law applicable to commu-
nications by commercial agencies is contrary to the doctrine
of the foregoing cases. In the case of Erber v. Dun (U. S. C_
Ct, E. D. Ark., 1882), 12 Fed. Repr. 526 (quoted in Locke v.
Bradstreet Co. (U. S. C. Ct., D. Minn., 1885), 22 Fed. Repr. 771),
the correct rule is thus stated: "A communication is privi-
leged within the rule, when made in good faith, in answer to,
one having an interest in the information sought, and it will be
privileged if volunteered, if the party to whom the communi-
cation is made, has an interest in it, and the party by whom it
is made, stands in such relation to him as to make it a reason-
able duty, or at least proper that he should give the informa-
tion." See, also, Trussell v. Scarlett (U. S. C. Ct., D. Md., 1882),
18 Fed. Repr. 214; Orinsby v. Douglas (1868), 37 N. Y. 477 ;
King v. Patterson (1,887), 49 N. J. L. 417 (see a brief review of
this case in 26, AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, N. S., 689-9o);
State v. Lonsdale (1880), 48 Wis. 348; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill,
Sup. Ct. Tex., Nov. 27, 1888,28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 125.
The communications of commercial agencies are not entitled
to any greater privilege than communications by other persons.
If" unrestrained by those legal principles which control the
acts and conduct of other persons under like circumstances,
these agencies, in the vastness of their operations, might become
instruments of injustice and oppression so grievous that public
policy would require their entire suppression." King V. Pat-
terson (1887), 49 N. J. L. 417.
"A commercial agency is a lawful business, and when con-
ducted lawfully, is a benefit to society and trade; but no just
reason can be given for a rule that would exempt it from
liability for false and defamatory publications, when other citi-
zens would not be exempt. If an individual voluntarily, or for
profit, give false and injurious information to persons interested
in the trade and commercial standing of another, at the time
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the information is given, such communication would be privi-
leged; but if he furnish the same information to others not so
interested-to traders and merchants as a class-the commu-
nication would not be privileged. A commercial agency
organized for the purpose of furnishing such information,
keeping an intelligence office for profit, should, it seems to us,
be held to the same accountability as an ordinary citizen. The
acts of the agency properly done, are no. more meritorious or
beneficial than when done by an individual, except that they
may be more extended and cover more transactions. Impartial
justice cannot imagine a sound reason for a distinction in favor
of an agency. It amounts to this, at last, and no more: the
business of a commercial agency is lawful when conducted
lawfully. It will be protected so long as it does not transgress
the rights of others. It is not entitled to any privilege denied
the ordinary citizen. If it is a greater benefit to trade than the
occasional acts of the individual, because more extended and
continuous in its operation, it is for the same reason capable
of doing more harm by its false reports. Its wrong-doing is
more difficult to remedy. Because it has a monopoly of such
intelligence, is no reason for giving it a privilege to do wrong
by an improper publication of false statements, though the pub-
lication may be in the usual course of business it has adopted.
It has the right, then, to the protection of a privileged commu-
nication when made to persons at the time interested in the
information, even though the information may be false; but
when communicated to its general subscribers, it has no such
right." Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, Sup. Ct. Tex., Nov. 27, 1888, 28
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 125.
Again it has been said that, "The publication of defamatory
matter affecting third persons, in a business prosecuted for
personal gain, can be tolerated only on grounds of public con-
venience. The rights of individuals ought not to be made to
yield to the exigencies of such a business, more than public
interests require. Public interests will be adequately conserved
by extending the immunity of privileged communications only
so far as to embrace communications to subscribers who have
special interest in the information. This restriction lays no
unreasonable restraint upon the business of the agencies in
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collecting and communicating information in the interest of the
public." King v. Patterson (1887), 49 N. J. L. 417.
It follows from the foregoing principles of law, that commu-
nications made by an agency in "notification sheets" to all of
its subscribers, without regard to whether they have a special
interest therein, are not privileged: Erber v. Dun (U. S. C. Ct.,
E. D. Ark., 1882), 12 Fed. Repr. 526; Taylorv. C7iurch (1853),
8 N. Y. 452; (see a review of this case, 26 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER, N. S. 682;) Commonwealth v. Stacey (I871), 8 Phila.
(Pa.) 617. Nor are such communications privileged because the
subscribers have contracted to treat the information as strictly
confidential: King v. Patterson (1887), 49 N. J. L. 417 (VAN
SYCKEL, J., dissenting in an able opinion). Nor because they
are printed in a cipher, the key to which is furnished to sub-
scribers only: Sunderlin v. Bradstreet (187I), 46 N. Y. 188.
(See, also, 26 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, N. S. 690-I.)
In the latest reported case, a commercial agency had fur-
nished to its subscribers generally, a book containing the
ratings of merchants. The space opposite the plaintiff's name
was blank, indicating that he had no business standing. It
was held that the communication was defamatory and not
privileged: Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, Sup. Ct. Tex., Nov. 27, 1888,
28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 125.
It has been urged that a defamatory communication is not
privileged, unless made directly by the proprietor of the agency.
In Beardslcy v. Tappan (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. N. Y., 1867), 15
Blatch. 497, it appeared that the agency kept a record of the
ratings of business men and firms, which was used by a number
of clerks in answering inquiries made by subscribers. The
Court said: "I am strongly inclined to think that, if the
establishments are to be upheld at all, the limitation attached
to them by the Court below is not unreasonable; to wit, that it
must be an individual transaction and not an establishment
conducted by an unlimited number of partners and clerks. The
principle upon which privileged communications rest, which
of themselves would otherwise be libelous, imports confidence
and secrecy between individuals, and is inconsistent with the
idea of a communication made by a society or congregation of
persons or by a private company or a corporate body."
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This case has been justly criticised: "The charge of the
trial judge and the reasoning of Mr. Justice NELSON place
unreasonable restrictions upon the doctrine of privileged com-
munications. Agents to collect information, clerks to record
it and to communicate it to subscribers, on the one hand, and
confidential clerks to receive the information in the interest and
by the authority of subscribers, on the other hand, are abso-
lutely necessary to the usefulness, if not the existence, of these
institutions:" King v. Patterson (1887), 49 N. J. L. 417. And
in Erber v. Dun (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Ark., 1882), 12 Fed. Repr.
526, referring to the opinion in Beardsley v. Tappan (1867), 5
Blatchf. (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. N. Y.), 497, it was said: "Courts
should not close their eyes to the necessary and uniform
method of conducting business among merchants and other
business men and corporations, and no rule should be adopted
that will render impracticable resort to these necessary and
convenient methods in any particular instance or branch of
their business, unless some principle imperatively demands it,
or it can be shown some good results will flow from it, results
actually different and better than obtain under existing methods.
* * * * * * The distinction attempted to be drawn between
the right to resort to the services of an agent in this business
and other legitimate business pursuits, is not well founded. It
is not in harmony with the known and universal methods of
conducting business. Commercial and other business pursuits
are conducted chiefly by partnerships and corporations, and the
former often, and the latter always, can act only by agents; and
any rule of law that would deny to them the right to avail
themselves of the services of an agent, in every department of
their business and for every legitimate purpose connected with
it, is unsound."
II. MALICIOUS REPORTS.
"A communication which would otherwise be privi-
leged, is not so, if made with malice in fact-that is, through
hatred, ill-will and a malicious desire to injure; and a state-
ment privileged in the first instance, may lose its privileged
character by being repeated and persisted in, after knowledge
of the fact that it is false and erroneous, has been brought
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home to its author:" Erber v. Dun (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Ark.,
1882), 12 Fed. Repr. 526.
A defamatory communication is not privileged, if reasonable
care and caution was not exercised in collecting the informa-
tion and it was imparted to others recklessly, without reason
to believe it true: Locke v. Bradstreet Co. (U. S. C. Ct., D. Minn.,
1885), 22 Fed. Repr. 771; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill (Sup. Ct.
Tex., Nov. 27, 1888).
The burden of proof is upon the commercial agency, to show
that the communication is prima facie privileged; but where
its privileged character is shown, the burden of proof is upon
the other party, to show that it was made with malice in fact:
Erber v. Dun (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Ark., 1882), 12 Fed. Repr. 5 26;
Ormsby v. Douglas (1868), 37 N. Y. 477.
III. LIABILITY TO SUBSCRIBERS.
Commercial agencies are bound to use ordinary care and
diligence in collecting the information which they furnish to
subscribers. Ordinarily, if they fail to do this, they are liable
in damages to the injured subscriber who has been misled by
their representations. The diligence required is that of "good
business men in the particular specialty:" Gibson v. Dun, Ct.
C. P. Hamilton Co., Ohio, 1876. In the case cited, a sub-
scriber sued the agency for negligence in failing to make
inquiry as to recorded incumbrances on the title to real estate,
which the agency reported to be in the name of a customer of
the subscriber, whereby the latter was induced to give credit,
to his injury. The Court said: "The testimony shows, that
according to the practice of all mercantile agencies in the
United States, such inquiry is never undertaken, such informa-
tion is never given, unless specially asked for, and in such case
the cost of making such inquiry is paid in addition to the usual
fees."
In a Canadian case, McLean v. Dun (1877), I Ont. App.,
153, it was held that an agency was not liable to its
subscribers for giving false information verbally. This was
under an act similar to "Lord Tenterden's Act" (9 Geo. IV.
14), which recited that "No action shall be brought to charge
any person, upon or by reason of any representation, or assur-
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ance, made or given, concerning or relating to the character,
conduct, credit, ability or dealings of any other person, to the
intent or purpose that such other person may obtain money,
goods or credit therefor, unless such representation or assur-
ance be in writing, signed by the party to be charged there-
with."
In a similar case in Pennsylvania, upon a cause of action
arising in Alabama, where a similar statute was in force, the
court held, that the action would lie, on the ground that the
statute was intended to be a shield in cases of honest mistake
merely, and not against misfeasance or negligence: Spraguc
v. Dun (1878), 12 Phila. (Pa.) 310.
A commercial agency may limit its liability to its subscrib-
ers; and a clause in the contract exempting it from liability for
the negligence of its agents, protects it against gross negligence,
even on their part: Duncan v. Dun (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Pa.,
1879), 9 Cent. L. J. 151 ; S. C., 7 W. N. C. (Pa.) 246.
IV. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS TO COMMERCIAL AGENCIES.
Not infrequently false representations are made to commer-
cial agencies, for the purpose of increasing or sustaining the
credit of the persons making them. It would seem proper,
that where such statements are communicated to a subscriber
,of an agency, who is induced thereby to extend a credit that
would not otherwise be given, the subscriber might treat the
transaction as tainted with fraud, as fully as where the repre-
sentation-is made directly to himself. But it has been held on
two occasions, that "where the only representations made, are
those furnished to sellers by the agencies, it must be clearly
shown that the accused buyer made the statements to the
agency with fraudulent intent to use such agency as an instru-
ment in accomplishing a fraud upon his vendor or some other
dealer." V-ictorv. Hfenien (1884), 33 Hun. (N.Y.) 549; Deicker-
Jioffv. Brown (Ct. App. Md., Jan. 1886), 21 Repr. 583.
V. SERVICE OF PROCESS.
In Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, Sup. Ct. Tex., Nov. 27, 1888, the
question arose as to whether service of process upon one who
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sometimes furnished a commercial agency with statements of
the business standing of merchants in the county, came within
the statute providing for service of process upon agents of
foreign corporations. It was said that: "The court [below]
should have instructed the jury, that if Finney was employed
or engaged by the company as its correspondent at the time
the suit was brought, to furnish it with information as to the
commercial standing of business men in Bastrop county, to be
used by the company in its reports to its customers and sub-
scribers in conducting the business of the company, then he
would be its agent, and he being a resident of the county, the
court has jurisdiction of the case. * * * * If relations exist
which will constitute an agency, it will be an. agency, whether
the parties understood it to be or not Their private intention
will not affect it."
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